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Abstract
The world automotive manufacturing environment has become continuously more
competitive over the past two decades. During the 1980s, in the United States, the U.S. domestic
automotive manufacturers were forced to improve their manufacturing operations with regards to
quality, leadtime and flexibility, using lean manufacturing methods, in response to foreign
competition. A similar focus on improving operating efficiency using lean manufacturing is now
emerging in European car markets.
This thesis focuses on the implementation of lean manufacturing techniques to improve
the operational effectiveness within the supply chain of a European automotive final assembly
plant of an U.S. based automotive manufacturer. The focus of the study consists of three major
facets of the internal supply chain: linefeeding improvements, inventory control policies, and
improvements in the material receipt and storage methods.
The reason for pursuing this project was to support the drive toward improving the
operational effectiveness by implementing lean manufacturing initiatives. In parallel with this
project, several other lean manufacturing initiatives were also in process, such as the Ford
Production System (FPS), that helped to support this project. All of these initiatives were being
undertaken to improve the profit potential within the Cologne assembly operations.
The goal of this research was to investigate methods of cost reduction by doing the
following actions:
" establish optimal inventory levels that will decrease working capital requirements while
increasing service levels,
* eliminate part delays throughout the system,
e improve the quality of parts within the system by "lowering the level in the river" and
" reduce the non-value added steps in the material replenishment process.
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The approach to the research began by gathering information about the current system,
such as the material demand and supplier leadtime. To establish the optimal inventory
requirements, the average and standard deviations of these variables where then used to calculate
the inventory needed based on the delivery frequency while accounting for the variability. The
current internal and external supply chain logistics were evaluated to determine the most efficient
routes to eliminate delays. Within the internal logistics systems, temporary storage areas for
material buffers, called marketplaces were planned and implemented. A marketplace consists of
clearly defined storage locations for each part with visible markings for minimum and maximum
allowed inventory levels that helped better organize and control material flow. The new
marketplaces and material handling routes were implemented in several areas within the assembly
plant.
The results of this research is strategy that a manufacturing company can use as
guidelines for improving the inventory control policies and material flow within its worldwide
assembly operations. The result of shifting to the proposed inventory control policy would be
annual savings of around $200,000 and a one-time savings from inventory liquidation of around
$1,000,000. The total savings due to the new material handling routes were unable to be
determined. Additionally, several observations regarding difficulty of implementation of new
manufacturing methods on a traditional mass production plant will be discussed.
Thesis Advisors:
David S. Cochran, Associate Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering
Donald B. Rosenfield, Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Statement of the Problem
The world automotive manufacturing environment has become continuously more competitive
over the past two decades. During the 1980s in the United States, the U.S. domestic manufacturers were
forced to improve their manufacturing methods with regards to quality, leadtime and flexibility. The
primary driver for this change in the U.S. was the entrance of the Japanese competitors with more
efficient manufacturing processes.
Volumes of research have been written on how the Japanese competitors were able to produce
cars more efficiently using "lean manufacturing" instead of the traditional mass production techniques
typically used by most Western automotive manufacturers in the 1980s. One of the most famous books on
the subject, The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al., 1991) led many U.S. auto
manufacturers to put together their own lean manufacturing programs in response to this competitive
threat. At many companies the tenets of the Toyota Production System, considered the first lean
manufacturing system, were rewritten into corporate manuals resulting in a new set of production
methods for the firm, such as the Ford Production System.
In Europe, the same competitive forces were not fully in place during the 1980s. However, the
Japanese automakers are now beginning to establish manufacturing plants throughout Europe to make
their models more competitive for the European market in terms of price and features. Their entrance is
significantly increasing the competitive nature of the market, particular in the smallest car segments. This
competitive threat is one of the reasons that U.S. automotive companies in Germany are beginning to try
to implement lean manufacturing processes to maintain a competitive edge.
For the Ford Cologne facility, the competitive pressure is very strong since the model built at
Cologne, the Fiesta, competes directly with a number of the new Japanese imports. Additionally, the labor
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costs in Germany have historically been very high, which, combined with the inefficiencies of mass
production, causes the total manufacturing cost to be higher than that of more efficient competitors.
The result, of the increased competition, is that most of Ford's facilities in Europe are undergoing
some form of lean manufacturing implementation to reduce cost, become more flexible and improve
quality. At Cologne Assembly, the Material Planning and Logistics manager was interested in
implementing lean manufacturing techniques to the material flow process. To meet this need, he
submitted a request to the Leaders for Manufacturing program at MIT for a research project.
The Cologne plant was a well-established mass production plant that was ripe for change. The
material flow process was filled with waste. One example of waste was the inventory levels of the
component parts. The stock levels were high in the plant for some parts; however, there were stockouts of
other parts. Another problem was that the Cologne plant had was that the material delivery system lacked
standardized methods. As a result, there were expeditors that continuously rushed necessary parts to the
line when needed. Additionally, wagonloads of material were randomly parked in most of the aisles and
at the receiving docks. A third problem was that there were no standardized systems for part delivery or
storage that were visually obvious to the operators. Finally, material handling's customer, the assembly
line, was not served with the right part at the right place at the right time. The focus of this thesis is to
explain the work that was performed to improve the situation of the Cologne plant with respect to these
problems within the material flow system.
1.2 Project Scope and Objectives
The scope of this project was to redefine the material flow and control methods for the trim line
area of the Ford Cologne assembly plant. The trim lines encompassed the assembly operations for most of
the interior cabin, the motor compartment and the hatchback area of the automobile. The project primarily
consisted of three main objectives pertaining to the material flow within this area of the plant:
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* Analyze and improve the methods how the material was delivered to the line,
* Analyze and improve the temporary storage methods of the material and
* Evaluate the inventory management for the plant.
The objectives of the project were developed in conjunction with the Materials Planning and Logistics
manager for the plant along with the Material Services manager. The result of these objectives was to
reduce the levels of inventory, where applicable, to the management goal of 1.4 days on average.
However, through the course of the research it was determined that this level was not necessarily
appropriate. An additional result desired was to implement a more "visual" system for inventory flow and
control. Finally, there was a need to better meet the requirements of the customer, the assembly line, by
delivering the right part at the right time in the right quantity.
1.3 Project Background
The Cologne Niehl Assembly operation is a traditional mass production facility. The plant has not
implemented many of the aspects of lean manufacturing that would help it achieve operational excellence
to become more competitive in the world marketplace. Ford is just beginning to use the Ford Production
System, or FPS, to educate and implement the lean manufacturing techniques developed by Toyota at its
plants around the world. However, this process was just beginning in Cologne in 1998 during the course
of this research.
One of the principle elements of FPS implementation is the realization of Synchronous Material
Flow, or SMF. SMF is the term used to describe a pull-based, continuous material flow system based on
Just-in-Time concepts such as kanban cards and single piece flow. SMF encompasses all of the aspects of
the material flow both inside the plant as well as deliveries to the plant from suppliers. Some of the goals
of SMF are to make the material flow more visible, to gain more control over the levels of inventory in
the plant and to improve the quality of the materials by making problems more visible.
Upon arriving at the Cologne plant, only the basic SMF training had taken place with the
employees and SMF methods were not in use at that time. Unfortunately, the plant lacked regular systems
17
for the material delivery to the line and temporary storage locations. Additionally, the plant was plagued
with inventory stockouts of some parts and excessive inventory levels of other parts. For example, based
on one analysis from 11 August 1998, $30.5 million was the total value of the inventory in excess of three
days stock and more than $1,000 in inventory value. To fight this problem of excess stock, personal
letters were written to request the suppliers stop shipping these parts.
Another problem in the plant was the fact that there was not a regular storage system, resulting in
problems locating parts. The storage locations that did exist were not visually clear, which caused a
problem with new operator training and with maintaining the appropriate inventory level. The lineside
replenishment system consisted of forklift drivers driving up and down the line to identify the necessary
parts and search for them because they were stored in haphazard locations. During the shift changes, the
next shift operator had to figure out where the last person had left the new parts delivered to him during
the last shift. As a result of the problems in the system, additional drivers were required to expedite parts
needed by the assembly line. With a more appropriate replenishment system, these expeditors would not
be necessary.
1.4 Summary
The Cologne assembly operation was a typical traditional mass production automotive assembly
plant. This work documented in this thesis was undertaken to make the plant more cost competitive in the
marketplace. This thesis consists of a description of some of the steps taken to implement lean
manufacturing techniques to material flow of the Cologne assembly plant and the results of that
implementation.
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Chapter 2: Project Background
2.1 Background of the Facility
2.1.1 History of the Cologne Niehl Assembly Operations
Ford began manufacturing cars at the Cologne Niehl facility in 1930. The plans for the site were
modelled as a scaled down version of Ford's famous River Rouge facility, one of the most renowned
landmarks of mass production. In fact, Henry Ford himself laid the cornerstone for the first assembly
building at the site. The facility has been through many different car models since that time, and the use
for each of the buildings has changed significantly. The current assembly building is approximately 4.6
million square feet. The Cologne assembly plant is Ford's fourth largest, of 53 assembly plants in the
world. A detailed layout of the plant is shown in Figure 1.
At the time of this analysis, the Cologne plant was manufacturing the Ford Fiesta in three and five
door versions and the Ford Puma, a two-door sports car. The daily production rate was around 1,215 per
day. The plant was meeting this demand by running two, 7.5-hour shifts, five days per week. Up until
June 1998 the plant produced a third model, the Scorpio. However, due to low demand in the market, this
model was discontinued. The elimination of this model allowed extra room within the plant to improve
the plant layout in terms of material flow and storage since part of the Scorpio assembly lines were left
vacant (identified as Scorpio Trim in Figure 1).
19
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2.1.2 Current Improvement Projects
Several other initiatives, directly related to lean manufacturing, were in process to improve the
production methods within the plant prior to this analysis. First, during 1998 the centralized packaging
group for Ford of Europe has been working to implement recyclable packaging for all components.
Second, there was a pilot implementation of the Ford Production System, or FPS, on one line in an
attempt to implement lean manufacturing techniques to the Cologne facility. Finally, Cologne was in the
process of implementing a Lead Logistics Provider, or LLP, to control all of the external logistics from
the supplier plants. Each of these improvement efforts is described in more detail below.
The recyclable container project was underway during late 1997 and throughout 1998. The
project strategy was based upon using a pool of leased containers of standard shapes that can be used for
packaging instead of cardboard. The container pool was managed by an external logistics company to
circulate the containers between Ford and its suppliers' sites. Following the conversion, the majority of
the parts came into the Cologne plant in either 1.0 m3 recyclable containers, called FLCs, or one of three
sizes of smaller standard containers called KLTs, both shown in Figure 2. This conversion in packaging
allowed for several improvements in material handling. First, the lineside racking could be standardized
for the given box sizes throughout the factory. Second, labeling of the parts could be consistently applied
across the full range of boxes. Finally, Ford saved a large amount of money from eliminating the disposal
of cardboard.
Figure 2: KLT and FLC Containers
KLT Container 21 FLC Container
The second large-scale initiative underway at Cologne during 1998 was the Initial Application
Area, or IAA, of the Ford Production System. The IAA chosen for the FPS initiative was the plant's door
assembly line, or doorline, since it was considered the bottleneck of the plant. The FPS training and
implementation began in early 1998 with the objective to create a model area of the plant for others to
follow as an example. The employees on the doorline went through extensive training on the FPS
methods of standardized work, waste reduction, quality control, synchronous material flow, and other
lean manufacturing topics.
One improvement that the FPS team implemented was eliminating most of the high vertical
storage racks at the lineside to make the assembly line more visible to all the operators and management.
Another improvement was the implementation of a kanban card replenishment route for small parts
between a marketplace to the line with a regular route time of two hours. Additionally, the operators were
trained in the 5 S's (sift, sort, sweep, standardize, spic & span in FPS terms) to improve the organization
and cleanliness of the plant. The initial FPS implementation was projected to reach the implementation
targets during the second half of 1998. In December 1998, the project reached most of the specific
objectives in terms of quality, cost, and work procedures.
A third initiative underway at Cologne during 1998 was the Lead Logistics Provider, or LLP,
initiative. The LLP was in the process of being evaluated during 1998 to try to control the flow of external
material from the suppliers. The LLP was a company contracted to improve the control of the external
logistics to the plant. Some of the LLP's work was to determine and verify the packing lists of the trucks
at the supplier according to the scheduled daily production. The truck would then be monitored
throughout its standardized route in order to meet a defined time window at the assembly plant.
Additionally, the routes would be rationalized based on efficiency and integrate concepts such as direct
delivery and "milk run" consolidations. Using the LLP effectively would result in more control on the
inventory levels in the pipeline and should result in lower costs resulting from stockouts and premium
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freight costs. The objective the LLP team was targeting was a reduction in annual freight costs by 19.4%1
The primary savings would result from reductions in normal freight costs by improving transport
utilization and increasing control of the shipments from each supplier.
Each of these other initiatives had directed attention to material flow process, which helped to
focus the need on improving the material flow across the plant. Particular aspects that we noted for
improvement were to make the system more visual and to standardized methods across the plant. These
aspects led to initiating the steps taken to improve the material flow process during the second half of
1998 at the Cologne assembly plant described in this thesis.
2.2 Approach Used for the Analysis
The approach used for the analysis of the system was based on investigating the various aspects
of lean manufacturing, particularly within the Toyota Production System, which are described further in
Section 2.3.2. The Cologne plant was evaluated against these lean manufacturing work methods and then
various aspects of them were implemented at the site during the study.
The first step in the analysis was to understand how the current system worked. The Cologne
plant is quite large and it took time to understand the material flow within the facility. Additionally, it
took time to investigate the current material control system, which included people such as the stock
counters and the use of the Direct Data Link (DDL), which was a form of Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI) with the suppliers.
The second step in the analysis was to gather data about the parts that were involved in the
process. There are over 3,500 part numbers that could be used in the plant on any given day. The
locations of these parts are spread out over a very long assembly line. There was a small team of workers
' data taken from a presentation of the preliminary analysis of the joint TNT and Ford Lead Logistics Provider Team
to the Cologne plant management, 29 October 1998.
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that helped to document the location of each part along the assembly line. Additionally, the team gathered
data for each of the parts according to packaging type, quantity per container and container size.
The next step was to gather data from the production control database. Database queries were
developed to find data for the daily demand each part, the length of travel time from the supplier, the
delivery frequency of the part and the current inventory level of each part.
The fourth step in the analysis was to use the information gathered to predict the optimal
inventory levels for each part using the Base Stock Model. These levels were calculated based on the
historical average and standard deviation of both the part demand and the leadtime of the supplier.
The final step was to implement control systems for the shop floor to make the delivery of
material more efficient. Standard delivery routes for the material handlers were implemented.
Additionally, temporary storage buffers of parts, called marketplaces, were established. Within the
marketplaces, each part had only one particular place and the location of each part was marked. Each of
the locations was also documented with the optimal inventory levels that were clearly marked as Min and
Max. Additionally, a first-in-first-out flow of material was established within the marketplaces. The
marketplace and material flow concepts are explained in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
2.3 Overview of the Research Findings
2.3.1 Problems with Mass Production
The problems at Ford's Cologne assembly plant are typical throughout the traditional mass
producers in the auto industry. The situation at the Cologne plant is similar to that noted at the GM
Framingham, Massachusetts assembly plant described in The Machine That Changed the World, the book
that defined some of the basic tenets of lean manufacturing. The description in the following passage was
based on a tour to the GM plant in 1986, however, the situation is virtually identical to that found in
Cologne in 1998.
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On the plant floor, we found about what we had expected: a classic mass-
production environment with its many dysfunctions. We began by looking down the aisles
next to the assembly line. They were crammed with what we term indirect workers -
workers on their way to relieve afellow employee, machine repairers en route to
troubleshoot a problem, housekeepers, inventory runners. None of these people actually
add value, and companies can find other ways to get their jobs done.
Next, we looked to the line itself Next to each work station were piles - in some
cases weeks' worth - of inventory. Littered about were discarded boxes and other
temporary wrapping material. On the line itself the work was unevenly distributed, with
some workers running madly to keep up and others finding time to smoke or even read a
newspaper. In addition, at a number ofpoints the workers seemed to be struggling to
attach poorly fitting parts to the Oldsmobile Ciera models they were building. The parts
that wouldn't fit at all were unceremoniously chucked in trash cans. (Womack, Jones &
Roos, 1991, p. 78)
Many of the elements of the Framingham plant are typical to mass production plants. The 1987 analysis
revealed that Framingham had 2 weeks worth of inventory compared to 2 days on hand at GM's NUMMI
joint venture with Toyota, a well known lean manufacturing site (Womack et al., 1991, p. 83). At
Cologne in June 1998, the inventory on average was around 5 days. The excess inventory is a drain of
capital from the firm. It is only necessary in order to cover up variation and quality problems due to poor
planning and lack of continuous improvement. The excess inventory also typically hides quality
problems. The defect rate of the Framingham plant was nearly twice as high as NUMMI at 1.35 versus
0.45 defects per car. The excess workers in the aisles were due to the fact that the rigorous union contracts
kept workers from performing multiple roles in the plant which hindered flexibility and continuous
improvement. Additionally, the excess workers added to the overall 31 labor hours needed per car
compared to 19 at NUMMI. The list of excess wasted resources could go on and on.
The term lean production was coined because it used less of everything compared to mass
production. According to Womack et al. (1991), it uses half the human effort in the factory, half the
investment in tools, half the manufacturing space and half the engineering hours to develop new products
while still resulting in fewer defects and greater variety in the product. The efficiencies can clearly be
seen in the comparisons of NUMMI, a typical lean plant, to Framingham, a typical mass production plant.
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These parallels can be extrapolated to Cologne, another typical mass production plant that is somewhat
better than GM's Framingham plant in 1987.
2.3.2 Tenets of Lean Manufacturing
Lean manufacturing is the generic term to denote the practices found in the Toyota Production
System, or TPS. Taichii Ohno and Eiji Toyoda created TPS in the 1950's to help Toyota cope with the
significant capital shortage within the company (Womack et al., 1991, p. 49). Many have documented the
key aspects of the Toyota Production System that enable it to yield system improvement and lead to a
more optimal use of resources. (Womack et al., 1991; Shingo, 1989; Monden, 1998) The first is
elimination of waste from the system. A second is set up time reduction. A third is balanced and level
production. Finally, the well-known Kanban and Just-in-Time systems can then be established.
The cornerstone of the Toyota Production System is the elimination of waste. In general, there are
seven basic kinds of waste that can typically be identified in any system (Shingo, 1989, p. 191):
1. overproduction,
2. delay,
3. transport,
4. processing,
5. inventory,
6. wasted motions and
7. making defects.
TPS religiously focuses on elimination of waste at each step making processes more productive through
continuous improvement activities. Many tools exist to help with waste reduction, such as the 7-step
problem solving process and basic statistical process control. Toyota never ceases to target the
elimination of waste. It is this discipline that is often lacking in mass production plants.
In many places throughout the Cologne plant, waste can be identified. Overproduction of
subassemblies that takes place in big batches from the subassembly groups due to lack of adequate
demand information. One example is within the air cleaner assembly cell, where the air cleaners were
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assembled in large batches of approximately 40 parts per box. The line used these parts in varying
quantities ranging from 16 parts per day to 266 per day. The operators would typically assemble 2 full
boxes and then put them on the shelf to wait, regardless of the demand. Additionally, due to packaging
decisions, parts waited in large containers for many hours, if not days, at the assembly line.
Approximately 48% of the packaging contained more than one full day's usage of parts. These large
boxes required using forklifts and wagon trains to move them. These vehicles exhibit extreme amounts of
wasted motion to deliver large boxes full of parts over distances of up to 500 meters due to suboptimal
plant layout. In summary, tremendous amounts of waste can be identified to remove by using lean
manufacturing techniques.
The second key aspect of TPS is setup time reduction. Setup time reduction is the more generic
term for Single Minute Exchange of Dies, or SMED. Used by Toyota, it means that the amount of time
needed to change a machine or cell over from one product to the next is continually reduced. By reducing
the setup times, the production process is more flexible and can easily switch production to meet the
customer's needs in a short period of time.
The third key aspect of TPS is balanced and level production. These characteristics are enabled
by setup time reduction. Balanced production means that the production resources of the firm can share
the production equally. This typically means that the product cells in a vertical value chain can share work
up and down the chain so that one of the cells does not serve as a significant bottleneck in the production
process. For example, assembly operations can be integrated into an upstream cell to alleviate a
bottleneck in the process. On the other hand leveled production means that manufacturing can produce in
the same product mix sequenced on a consistent and level basis that is consistent with the percentages
demanded by the customer. For example, if 10% of the cars demanded by the customer require a sunroof,
then every 1 car on the assembly line would be sequenced to have a sunroof. Takt time is the key driver
of leveled production. Takt time is defined as the total operating hours divided by the salable quantity of
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product, it is the amount of time between successive pull signals for the particular product. Takt time sets
the "beat of the drum" for the leveled production.
One of the most major elements of TPS is Just-in-Time (JIT) production. JIT is the ultimate goal
of TPS - to make exactly the material needed by the customer in exactly the right quantity, in exactly the
right place, at exactly the right time. This type of system can only be realized in a system that has short
setup times, where production is balanced and level, and where waste has been driven out of the system.
Typically a kanban pull system consisting of cards circulated between the customer and supplier is used
to enable JIT. The pull signal for the quantity, place and time is communicated to the supplier by the
kanban card. In turn the supplier delivers the material just in time to the customer. The most responsive
configuration of this system is single piece flow, however typically the parts are delivered in small lots
consisting of several hours of stock.
Each of the key points of the Toyota Production System and lean manufacturing mentioned above
are imperative to making the system function together efficiently to meet the customer's needs. The
system has many contrasts to typical mass production, which causes a significant challenge during the
implementation of the changeover.
2.3.3 Implementation of Lean Manufacturing
Following The Machine that Changed the World, many companies raced to implement their own
from of their own lean production system, modeled after the Toyota Production System. Ford developed
its own version of lean manufacturing, the Ford Production System, which has been implemented with
various levels of success. Based upon the author's interpreting works from well know researchers in the
field such as Monden (1998), Womack et al. (1991, 1996) and others (Black, 1991; Shingo, 1989), FPS
seems to encompass many of the elements of the Toyota Production System.
Ford has several successful implementations of lean manufacturing that the author had the chance
to visit during the course of this research. The team based approach for machining and assembly at the
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Cleveland Engine Plant was highly successful. In terms of inventory reduction and control, their card-
based replenishment, or kanban, system had facilitated an estimated $500 million dollars in inventory
savings 2. Another kanban system that was in the process of being implemented at Ford's Saarlouis
Germany Assembly Plant was studied during the course of this analysis.
Many other firms have also successfully implemented lean manufacturing techniques. For
example, Porsche, the German sports car manufacturing firm, began implementing lean in 1991 to reduce
the firm's high cost structure to keep the company competitive in the world market. First, the company
reduced layers of management throughout the firm to speed decision making. Next, intensive training was
used to teach the lean techniques. Waste was eliminated from the production process by having teams
analyze the production process and new quality circles were implemented. The number of suppliers was
reduced from 950 to 300 by standardizing parts and dropping low volume options. Product development
groups were reorganized into cross-functional teams that were collocated and had representatives from
production on the team. The actual results from 1991 to 1995 are very encouraging. Inventories were
reduced from 17 to 4.2 days on average. Direct plus indirect labor hours per car were reduced from 120 to
76 hours. Finally, the number of defects of supplied parts was reduced from 10,000 to 1,000 parts per
million. (Womack et al., 1996, p.213)
Every firm has a tough start implementing lean manufacturing. Typically, the reason is that only
one or two portions of the lean techniques are implemented. Just-in-Time, or JIT, inventory management
was a well known "flavor of the month" in the early 1990s. Wiremold is an example of a firm that tried to
implement JIT because its V. P. of Operations had seen it during factory tours in Japan.
"He came back praising the concept of Just-in-Time and immediately set about
pulling down inventories and reducing lot sizes. What he could not do, because no one
knew how, was introduce flow and pull by reducing changeover times for Wiremold's
tools and building to a level schedule." (Womack et al., 1996, p. 126)
2 According to the Material Planning and Logistics manager of the Cleveland Engine Plant, August 1998.
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The result of Wiremold's struggles with JIT was that the company slid from record profits to just break
even over the following two years. The customer service was considerably lower. Problems that had been
covered by the mountains of inventory were now causing disruptions to the schedule. One of their
executives noted that the company "nearly JIT'd ourselves to death by doing it the wrong way" (Womack
et al., 1996, p. 127). In the end, Wiremold set out to find someone that could help them implement a new
way correctly. The significance of this example is that all of the components of lean manufacturing fit
together like a puzzle. Each piece is required to make it complete and function properly.
2.4 Summary
Lean production embodies an entirely new set of techniques for manufacturing. Many firms have
adopted lean manufacturing in a variety of different ways with varying success. One of the keys to
success is implementing the full range of techniques. Simply singling out just one of the techniques, such
as JIT, will not necessarily result in success.
The Cologne facility has a long history of as a manufacturing site for Ford. Many of the typical
aspects of its mass production heritage can still be seen throughout the site. However, there are many
improvement efforts underway to make the assembly operations changeover from mass to lean production
techniques.
The problems evident at Cologne are typical throughout the auto industry. There are a number of
examples of best practices of lean manufacturing that exist that can be used as models for improving the
system. This thesis will step through the process of identifying areas for improvement and the process for
implementing those changes to the material handling process at Cologne. The basis for the improvement
will be the fundamentals of the Toyota Production System, the inventor of lean manufacturing.
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2.4.1 Key Summary Points
* Cologne has a firmly entrenched mass production heritage at the moment that is not different
from other traditional established automakers.
* Cologne is in the process of implementing FPS and LLP in areas that will improve its operations.
* Lean methods could help Cologne, primarily with variation reduction and elimination of waste.
* Lean manufacturing must be implemented as a whole since the parts don't function well
independently. (e.g. JIT doesn't work without a predictable, level schedule)
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Chapter 3: Initial Analysis
3.1 Introduction
A large amount of data needed to be collected in order to begin to reconfigure elements of the
material flow system. First, packaging data was needed to determine the lineside address and quantities
per box. Next, the quantity and variation of parts demanded was required. Finally, an assumption was
made regarding delivery time average and variation from the suppliers. All of this data was used as input
for determining the optimal inventory levels in the plant, discussed in Chapter 4.
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Lineside Data for Every Part
The first step was to gather detailed descriptions of the assembly line part usage and packaging
characteristics. A team of material handling workers was established to record packaging data for each
part by walking down the line and writing down the information, shown in Table 1, which was entered
into a database for later use.
Table 1: Part Information Collected from the Packaging on the Assembly Line
Part number Prefix, Base and Suffix of Part Number
POF Point of Fit - Lineside Address
Packaging Type of Packaging:
FLC - 1m3 recyclable box
KLT - one of three sizes of small containers
Karton - cardboard box
Quantity Number of Pieces per Box
Incidentally, there was a packaging database on site, called NewPac, which should have
contained all of this information. However, the database was not regularly maintained and the information
was not necessarily reliable due to frequent part number revisions and packaging changes. By November
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1998, the plant had implemented a new system for production control, named CMMS3. The packaging
data from NewPac was updated and linked into this system which should improve the reliability of this
information in the future.
3.2.2 Demand Data for Every Part
The next step in the analysis was to determine the usage rate for each part. The Cologne plant
maintains its production control information within a database, to which queries were written to
determine several attributes, shown in Table 2, related to the production usage of each part. Combinations
of this data would be used later to determine the optimal inventory levels within the material flow
process.
Table 2: Part Information Collected from the Production Control Database
Part number Prefix, Base and Suffix of Part Number
Demand Daily number of parts demanded by the line
Supplier Supplier code
Frequency Delivery Frequency to the plant, i.e. daily, weekly, monthly, etc.
Leadtime Delivery travel time in days from the supplier to Cologne
Inventory Quantity of parts in the plant inventory
There were a few inconsistencies in the database, particularly related to Frequency and to
Leadtime. The data was not updated on a regular manner for both of these attributes. The primary reason
it was not updated was that no calculations were dependent on these numbers and no one had the direct
ownership of updating any changes to these attributes. Additionally, there was no code for deliveries
more frequent than once per day, even though several suppliers delivered two or three times per day.
New part numbers entered into the system when an engineering change occurred caused another
inconsistency in the data. In these case, the inventory balance of obsolete parts was not always updated
immediately after the change to the new part occurred, and as a result the information was not readily
available for some new parts running on the line.
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3.2.3 Travel Time for Every Part
The travel time for each part was taken directly from the Ford production database from the field
Leadtime. In most cases, there was not a distribution of actual data to compare this value with.
Additionally, there was no information available regarding estimates for non-travel components of an
order's leadtime. To simplify the analysis, it was assumed that variation in non-travel leadtime was
negligible compared to that of travel time. In order to estimate a variance for the distribution of the
leadtime, parts were broken into two distinct classifications - those coming from within Europe and those
from outside of Europe.
Parts coming from within Europe typically had leadtimes of less than five days. The most distant
European suppliers for Cologne were located in Portugal, which was a five-day drive. However, the plant
also had many parts that were within a one-day delivery range. For all parts, with delivery times less than
or equal to 5 days, it was assumed that the distribution of leadtimes was normal with a standard deviation,
a, of 0.5 days. Using this assumption, a 99% confidence interval for truck arrival would be within 1.15
days of the expected arrival time.
The second distribution of leadtimes was for parts coming from outside of Europe. Typically,
these parts had longer leadtimes and higher variability associated with the delivery times due to customs
and other shipping related issues. For these parts, the distribution was assumed to be normal with a
standard deviation of 1 day. Using this assumption, a 99% confidence interval for truck arrival would be
within 2.3 days of the expected arrival time.
Each of these distributions was based upon speaking with the personnel from the shipping dock
and material control at the Cologne plant. The distinction was made in order to account for the higher
variability from parts sourced from outside of Europe. In practice, actual data from the delivery times
should be used to set the inventory levels rather than the approximations proposed here. Following the
arrival of the new CMMS3 system in November 1998, actual delivery data should be available within the
database. This should significantly improve the estimates for order leadtime and variation.
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3.3 Summary
In order to determine inventory levels, first part demand and order leadtime information was
required. The production control database was queried to gather some of this data. However the
packaging directly on the line was also used. The integrity of this data is very important, since the smooth
flow of the plant depends upon it. In several situations, where the data was questioned, assumptions were
made and the progress continued on. As the new production control database comes along, the robustness
of the data should improve.
3.3.1 Key Summary Points
e Packaging data from the actual lineside packaging was used to determine packaging type and
quantity per box.
" The production control database was used to determine daily part demanded by the assembly
lines.
* Two assumptions were made for the variance of the travel times from European and non-
European suppliers since data was not available for this information.
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Chapter 4: Improvements in the Inventory Management
Methods
4.1 Introduction
The Cologne plant has been focusing on inventory reduction for several years. The current
inventory management policy of the plant was a simple rule set by management, 1.4 days stock on
average. Monthly inventory meetings consisting of upper management of the plant and inventory control
analysts established the inventory levels. However many problems still arise with either stockouts or too
much stock.
Figure 3: Inventory Value and Days Stock, September 1998
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Upon analyzing data in September 1998, the average number of days inventory in stock found in
the plant based upon the weekly average part usage was found to be 89 Days. The inventory was 25 days
based upon maximum usage documented over the month. However, there were a number of parts with a
very high number of days that skew the data. The median based on the average demand was 4.0 days and
1.9 days based on maximum demand. Figure 3 contains an example of a report of the excess inventory
conditions for parts over 10,000 DM ($6,000) in value and over 10 days stock. This figure identifies parts
with highly valued inventory levels that may be able to be reduced. The objective of this chapter is to
investigate setting the optimum inventory level by using the Base Stock Model.
4.2 The Inventory Control Process
There were several steps in the inventory control process. The process began with either an
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) with the suppliers or a manual order. The suppliers were given a
preliminary planned build schedule 15 days out. The plan was finalized into a firm build schedule, which
was fixed five days prior to the build date. The suppliers would ship to this forecasted build volume. The
inventory shipped from the supplier was then received at the Cologne plant and put into storage or used
immediately at the line.
The first line of inventory control was the Stockchecker. This person was responsible for
maintaining inventory counts and for verifying the level of the inventory was adequate to meet the
production needs. When I first arrived at the plant, the Stockcheckers were assigned to certain suppliers.
However, before I left they were in the process of converting to have the responsibility for a distinct
portion of one line.
Typically, the Stockcheckers verified the production requirements by looking at the demand over
the next three days and checking this amount versus what was in stock at the moment. This information
was available from the production control system and from daily "shortage" or "excess" reports of
inventory values.
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In cases where the Stockchecker found inventory above the necessary level, they were supposed
to notify the Check and Adjust group. This group was responsible for eliminating obsolete parts and for
adjusting the level of stock to an appropriate level.
If the inventory level was not enough to meet the next day's production, then action was taken to
expedite the order from the supplier through the Disponent group. The Disponent group was responsible
for controlling the logistics traffic to the plant. Typically they controlled the truck movements within the
yard and called the trucks into the receiving area when needed. They were normally responsible for
coordinating the shipments from several suppliers. The Disponent would know where the needed parts
were in the shipment process and if they could be expedited.
Figure 4: Inventory Level Scenario Based on Daily Delivery
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The target inventory level of 1.4 days on average was based on the fact that the majority of the
parts had daily deliveries. A saw-toothed inventory level as shown in Figure 4 results from the normal
daily usage and the daily deliveries. The 1.4 days average stock is a result of the maximum stock level of
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1.9 days and the minimum of 0.9 days safety stock, or "Iron Reserve", results in the average of 1.4 days
stock goal set by management.
4.3 Problems with the Current System
4.3.1 Stock Control Problems
The inventory control system described above had several systemic problems. First, there were
inherently large numbers of parts that were not in stock at any given time. One reason for this was the fact
that the Stockcheckers only looked over demand for next three days to check if there were enough parts in
stock. This resulted in many cases where there was not enough inventory in the pipeline to meet the
demand over the next few days. Additionally, sometimes they would expedite orders from the suppliers,
which would cause excess inventory to be shipped.
Some of the problems in the system were a result of differences between the actual count of stock
on the floor and the stock found in the computer system. Parts were located in many different areas of the
plant and it was difficult for the Stockcheckers to get an actual count of the parts. In some cases, the parts
were not entered into the system even though they were on the floor. In other cases, part count data was
entered into the system wrong.
Figure 5: Variation Found Within the Supply Chain
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4.3.2 Variation in the Supply Chain
There are typically at least two types of variation inherent in a supply chain, demand variation
and replenishment leadtime variation from the supplier, as shown in Figure 5. However, in the Cologne
inventory control system the optimal inventory level was not based on variation.
To determine the effect of variation, the distribution of demand during the average leadtime is
used to determine the variation in demand. Additionally, the distribution of leadtime is a function of the
variation in leadtime of any given order is also needed. Typically, the distributions of each of these
variables can be approximated by the normal distribution, as indicated in the bell shaped curves in Figure
5, then the historical values are used as estimates for the expected values in the future.
To account for the overall variation in the supply chain, the two distributions of order leadtime
and demand will be combined to form the synthesized distribution. While the synthesized distribution is
not strictly a normal distribution, it can typically be approximated as one. From the synthesized
distribution, the optimal minimum and maximum inventory levels can be inferred.
The effect on inventory levels can be logically obtained. For example, the longer the travel time
from the supplier, the higher the inventory holding requirements because of the long adjustment time in
the inventory level. Additionally, high demand variation is another reason to hold higher inventory levels
to cover the periodic swings in demand. Travel time and demand variation are the key variables to
minimize in order to lower inventory levels and make the system more predictable.
4.3.3 Management Problems
An additional problem within the system was that corrective action would require long delays to
adjusting the inventory levels. The reason for the delay was that there were several groups that the
information passed through in order to adjust the level of inventory. In most cases, the priorities were
placed only on meeting the demand for the current schedule and excess inventory situations were not as
high of a priority. This problem was particularly prevalent on parts with engineering changes. The
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Stockcheckers would wait until they received word from the Engineering group that the change was
expected to take place in a part number. Typically, by that time the new parts had already been sent from
the supplier. This caused a problem on the floor regarding which part to use and what to do with the old
parts. It also caused a problem in bookkeeping because the old parts needed to be purged from the system.
Overall there were many significant problems with the change procedures to new part versions.
Another problem resulted from the fact that since inventory control was spread over several
groups, no one took ownership for the problem. The Stockcheckers only counted the parts and looked to
make sure there was enough to meet the demand. The Check and Adjust group only adjusted levels when
requested. The Disponents' focus was only to move the parts in a smooth flow to prevent the line from
stopping, not reduction in waste. In summary, the lack of ownership caused inventory reduction efforts to
stall.
4.4 Reduction in Variation
The problems mentioned with the system were some of the primary drivers of the variation in the
system. In particular, the engineering changes drove a significant amount of variation in the inventory
levels on a regular basis. Adequate control systems were not in place for the part number changes. The
result was that obsolete parts regularly were not removed from the line and the old and new parts became
mixed. Standardizing the control process for new part numbers would greatly improve the changeover to
new parts.
Additionally, the demand variation of new parts caused the demand pattern of these parts to look
quite irregular. The optimal inventory level is difficult to calculate based on having a demand of zero until
the part is released for use and then a demand higher than zero. Historical demand for the old part number
could be used as a predictor of what level of inventory to carry for the new part number.
Another difficult part of the system was related to the Daily Call In, or DCI, which was not
always a reliable method of control for the suppliers' shipments. DCI was the broadcast of the required
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part schedule to the suppliers. This schedule was fixed approximately five days before the parts were
needed. In many cases the suppliers would ship more or less than the DCI request for the given day. It
was truly a push system. For example, when the supplier would have a shutdown, in many cases they
would over ship parts to the plant to cover their shutdown. Then the assembly plant had to find a place for
these extra parts. In one instance during July 1998, the supplier for air cleaners had a shutdown at their
plant. They sent several extra truckloads to the Cologne plant to cover their shutdown. The parts remained
in the marketplace for several months waiting to be used. Meanwhile, other air cleaners were being used
in production on a last-in-first-out basis. An additional problem, related to DCI, was that the schedule
would shift based on process variation in paint, body construction or some other area of the plant.
Another source of variability was that the location of all of the parts in the plant was not standard.
In the air cleaner example, the parts were stored away from the normal receiving point so they were never
used in a FIFO manner because the operators never saw the old parts waiting in the marketplace.
Additionally, the variability in storage location wasted the operators' time looking for the parts. Also, in
some cases the stock quantities were incorrect in the computer system because the parts were not counted
because they could not be found.
Finally, the delays in adjustment time and lack of ownership explained before caused the
problems in the plant to amplify. For example, at one point several days of inventory for a part used for
insulation was found in a very congested area of the plant. Upon notifying the stockcheckers, they
notified the check and adjust group, however, nothing was ever done to adjust the level. After several
attempts of asking about solving the problem, no one would work on reducing the level. The result was
that the additional deliveries would simply begin to pile up because there were other fires to fight.
4.5 The Importance of Packaging
Packaging is another important aspect of the material control process. Throughout the Cologne
plant, large containers full of material can be found. The reason is a result of the packaging conversion
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strategy begun in 1997 by the centralized packaging group. This group works with all of the plants in
Europe to consistently package the parts in the most cost effective box size. However, in many cases, the
most cost effective box size for the packaging group can lead to large boxes of material that sit on the
manufacturing floor for days.
The analysis in Figure 6 is a histogram of the number of parts that may have incorrect packaging.
The figure shows that 48% of the parts have packaging that holds more than a full daily requirement of
the parts. The packaging group should take a look at the packaging for each part to see if the quantity per
box could be reduced. The FPS target is to have approximately 2 hours stock on average at the lineside.
Based on the analysis shown in Figure 6, the FPS goal would be impossible due to the high number of
parts with packaging containing over one day's worth of stock.
Figure 6: The Impact of Packaging and the Time per Box
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4.6 Improvements to the Current System
4.6.1 Establishing Ownership
One improvement to the system would be to assign ownership of the inventory levels to one
group within the plant. They should be responsible for both maintaining the operational stock and then to
systematically reduce the levels lower whenever possible. The Stockchecking group would be well suited
for this task. The realignment of the stockcheckers to certain areas of the plant, rather than focused around
particular suppliers as was the case in December 1998, is a step in the right direction. Additionally, the
group should begin to look at the entire inventory in the pipeline at least five days out, not only the
inventory on hand and the next three days demand. The system should all function together and the
stockcheckers should work closely with the material handling operators to function as a team.
4.6.2 Using the Base Stock Model for Optimal Inventory Levels
Setting the inventory levels is the most important part of a JIT replenishment system. If too much
inventory is specified, all the benefits of JIT are lost. Waste of inventory results and quality problems can
be hidden. By setting the inventory levels too low, the system may not meet the requirements of the
customer. Basing the inventory levels by accounting for uncertainty in the demand and leadtime can
prevent both of these situations.
The Base Stock Model uses the variance of the demand during the leadtime to calculate the
minimum, "Min", and maximum, "Max", target levels of inventory. It is a well-known model that has
been investigated for use by a number of other sources. (Monden, 1989, pp. 423-436; B. Black, 1998, p.
25; Nahmias, 1997, pp. 265-295) This model predicts how much inventory should be held based on the
mean and variation of both historical demand and order leadtime. Using basic statistics and the
assumption that the distributions are normal, the mean inventory in the pipeline and synthesized standard
deviation of the system can be obtained as the following:
Target Inventory = Average Daily Demand Over the Leadtime + Safety Stock
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The equation for the target inventory level in the pipeline can be formulated as:
I= p * YD + SS
While the variation of the synthesized distribution of the inventory can be formulated:
2 = Pr * 2 + p2 4T 2
Where the following variables are used:
I = Expected number ofparts in inventory in the total pipeline
T = Mean of non-travel leadtime (r), travel time (1) and
working days between deliveries (d) all in days
9D = Expected average daily demand, QD, over (r + I + d) in number ofparts
GI = Synthesized variance of the inventory level
aD = Standard deviation of daily demand in number ofparts
T = Standard deviation of non-travel and travel time in days
SS = Safety Stock, described below
As noted earlier, this particular formulation accounts for variation in both demand and leadtime. The
variation in demand was based on the actual data gathered from Cologne production database as
described in Chapter 3. The variation in leadtime was determined based on assumptions discussed in
Section 3.1.3.
In order to meet the needs of the customer in the next period, the inventory level in the
marketplace, I, after demands are placed on it must be greater than or equal to zero. Safety stock is used
to meet the variation in demand beyond what is expected. The safety stock can be determined by
assuming a probability of always having enough stock on hand, represented as:
Probability (I - q > 0)=
Where,
a = Customer service level desired, assume a = 99%
q = Amount demanded by the customer
I = Inventory level in the store
By choosing cc = 99%, the safety stock required to meet the demand 99% of the time can be determined.
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The first step, in calculating the safety stock, is to determine the service level factor, Z, implied
by choosing a level of a from the standard normal distribution. By choosing a level of c = 95% or a =
99%, Z is implied as Z = 1.64 or Z = 2.33, respectively. Based on the assumption of a service level factor,
x = 99%, the safety stock level, SS, can be determined by:
SS = Z * o-, = 2.33 *a,
The term, Z * orI, represents the safety, or minimum, stock necessary to meet the variation in upcoming
demand. Additionally, it represents the initial stock needed in the system to begin the cycle for a new part.
The maximum and minimum levels that should be maintained in the plant at any given time can
be calculated from the safety stock and mean demand as the following:
Max = D * Days between Successive Deliveries + Safety Stock, or
Max = po* d + Z * o7
and,
Min = Safety Stock = Z * og
The values calculated for Min and Max represent the optimal inventory levels within the plant. There are
many factors that affect these inventory levels. First, more inventory is needed to cover a supplier that is
far away due to the long leadtime associated with adjusting the inventory level. Second, the variation in
the travel time from the supplier requires the plant to hold inventory in case the supplier is late with the
delivery. Third, the variation in part demand makes it more difficult to predict exactly what is needed in
the plant on any given day.
Ideally the plant would work using a pull system, and only replace the inventory that is used from
the Max value each day. Theoretically, that is how the plant operates today using the DCI. However, the
long leadtime from the suppliers and high variation in both the demand and travel time make it difficult
for suppliers to adjust the levels quickly.
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4.7 Evaluation of the New Methods Within the Cologne Plant
4.7.1 Evaluating the Cologne Plant Inventory Levels Using the Base Stock Model
By using the Base Stock Model to calculate the optimal Min and Max inventory levels, the result
is that some parts are over the optimal level and some parts are under the optimal level. The graph in
Figure 7 show the difference between the actual stock shown in the production control database versus the
optimal inventory level predicted by the Base Stock Model with a service level of 99%. The necessary
adjustment to achieve the optimal inventory value is represented by the height of the column. The height
is the amount of inventory beyond the requirement calculated using the base stock model. The graph
shows this adjustment in inventory measured in day's stock based on the average daily usage. Where the
height of the column is below zero, the plant should invest in more inventory to cover the variation on
these parts. Where the height of the column is above zero, the plant could reduce the inventory level by
this amount of days for these parts and still meet the demands of production with a 99% confidence level.
Figure 7: Difference between Actual and Optimal Inventory Levels from the Base Stock Model
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The result to the plant from implementing the Base Stock Model would be significant in dollar
terms. Using the available data for 1550 parts of 2537 parts with demand on November 20 1998, the
model predicts that the total inventory level in the plant should be 15.2 million DM (approx. $9.1
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million). The total inventory held in the plant for these particular part numbers was 17.2 million DM
(approx. $10.3 million). The summary of the savings to the plant can be calculated as shown in Table 3. A
one time savings of 2.0 million DM ($1.2 million) and an ongoing savings of 320,000 DM ($190,000) per
year.
Table 3: Projected Inventory Savings Based on Implementing the Base Stock Model
for Inventory Control (using a 99% Service level)
17,155 DM 100%
Inventory Value, Nov. 20, 1998 $10,293
Optimal Inventory Value, calculated using the Base Stock Model 15,171 DM 88%
$9,103
One Time Savings from Inventory Liquidation 1,984 DM 12%
$1,190
Annual Savings from Reduction in Working Capital 317 DM N/A
(valued at 16% Cost of Capital) $190
4.7.2 Practical Usage of the Base Stock Model
At the conclusion of this research in December 1998, the Cologne plant was not using the Base
Stock Model for inventory control. However, this model could be easily implemented into the current
management process at the Cologne plant. In particular the new procedure could be integrated into the
new CMMS3 production control software installed during November 1998. The CMMS3 system will
centralize all of the production and logistics information for the entire plant. It could effectively be
expanded as a tool for better inventory control as well.
Integration would not be difficult because the CMMS system has a database that contains
information on the daily demand of each part and the historical leadtime from the suppliers. From this
table of data, the average and standard deviation for travel time and demand could be calculated. The
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program could use this information to calculate, using the Base Stock Model, the optimum minimum and
maximum stock levels of inventory to hold in the plant.
The result would be a better target for the inventory level necessary to meet the needs of the
assembly line. Additionally, the inventory requirements would be more long range focused than the 3 day
window that is currently used at the moment. High and low levels of inventory could be monitored
through regular reports, similar to what is now used by the Stockcheckers for inventory control. Overall,
the process should result in better serving the needs of the final customer, the assembly line, and in saving
money with lower inventory investments.
4.7.3 Comparison of the Base Stock Model to FPS
FPS presents a third technique to setting inventory levels, the others being the Base Stock Model
and management policy of 1.4 days. The Base Stock Model is significantly different from the FPS
approach to calculate optimal inventory levels. The FPS technique was evaluated from the training
materials for the SMF Single Point Lessons published by the Ford FPS central office in Dearborn. This
analysis will present why the Base Stock Model is more appropriate than the FPS approach.
The Base Stock Model is a theoretical method to calculate the optimal inventory levels in a plant
based on demand and leadtime variation. In contrast, the FPS approach does not take into account
variation when setting the inventory levels for Min and Max. It simply uses a safety factor of 0.5 times
the expected demand over the replenishment time. The safety stock calculated using the FPS rules is:
Safety StockFPS= 0.5 * pD
Comparing the Base Stock Model with the FPS system results in an interesting observation. The FPS
numbers imply a coefficient of variance of 0.2, assuming a 99% service level or 0.3 assuming a 95%
service level. This result is obtained by the following manner:
MaxFPS = + 0.5 * pD
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Assuming a normal distribution of the demand during the leadtime and Z equal to the standard normal
distribution coefficient, the following relationship is true:
MaXBase Stock - ItD + Z * 01
Setting the two equations for max stock equal results in:
p-1D + Z * aI = pD + 0.5 * p1D
From which the coefficient of variation can be calculated after simplifying the above equation:
Coefficient of Variation = pLD /GI = 0.5 / Z = 0.5 / 2.33 = 0.2
Based on the data collected for this thesis, the minimum coefficient of variation for all parts was greater
than 0.2, as shown in Figure 8. This implies that using the FPS numbers for calculating the inventory
levels will result in too little inventory in most cases. At the moment, the FPS system has only been
applied to internal material flow routes, however there are serious problems that could result from using
such a simplified calculation to set optimal inventory levels from the incoming supply chain.
Figure 8: Coefficient of Variation of Parts
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4.8 Summary
The inventory control policies followed by the Cologne plant at the moment are having problems
meeting the needs of the plant. There are parts shortages, excess inventory and changeover problems
related to new part models.
This chapter proposed several methods to fixing these problems. First, changing the management
structure for inventory control and adopting one group dedicated to inventory control within the supply
chain. Second, establishing optimal inventory levels, using the Base Stock Model, based on historical
demand and replenishment time average and standard deviation to account for variation within the supply
chain.
The result of these efforts would be that the customer will be served better and that the group can
begin to focus on improvement activities on variation reduction to support inventory reduction efforts.
The calculations show that the plant can theoretically achieve a reduction in overall inventory level of
approximately 12%. The result would be a one-time savings of about $1.2 million in inventory reduction
and an annual savings of approximately $190,000 per year due to the reduction in working capital
required.
4.8.1 Key Summary Points
* The packaging, with almost 50% of boxes containing at least 1 day's stock in a box, is not
consistent with FPS guidelines for approximately 2 hour stock at the lineside.
* Inventory control is primarily based only on chasing shortage parts at the moment resulting from
3 day view of demand for control and adjustment purposes.
* Management goal of 1.4 days stock on average is not realistic given the current high variation in
the demand and leadtime.
* The Base Stock Model could be used to integrate variation into the inventory control methods
for the supply chain. Overall savings by using the Base Stock Model are estimated at $190,000
per year plus a one time savings of $1,200,000.
* Unlike the Base Stock Model, FPS's approach to inventory levels does not explicitly take
variation into account, in most cases resulting in inventory levels that are too low.
* High coefficient of variation for a large number of parts implies a large amount of inventory
investment necessary for these parts.
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Chapter 5: Improvements in the Material Receipt and
Storage Process
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the current methods of receiving material into the plant and storing it
temporarily until it is needed at the line. A method for eliminating waste from the material receipt process
is presented. Additionally, methods used to organize the material storage process are presented.
5.2 Current Material Receipt and Storage Process
The current material handling process utilizes equipment typically expected for a mass production
plant, forklifts, tow motors, and large wagons. The process is designed to facilitate using large boxes that
hold several hours, or days, of material. A more detailed description of the material receipt process will be
given below, however a summary is contained in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Summary of Receiving Material Flow Process
Delivery to
Lineside
Call Unload Truck Verify Invoice
and Write Material LoadedDispatcher with Forklift * Delivery Location ontoWao
for Truck to Open Area on Box onto agon
Delivery to
Marketplace
The process begins at the receiving dock, where the large 40-foot trucks are unloaded. The plant
as a whole receives about 160 trucks per day. Over half of that volume, between 85-90 trucks, is received
at the largest receiving area, 2 - Y South, as shown in Table 4. These trucks are called in with the material
as needed from a temporary waiting area. The trucks are completely unloaded in the receiving area and
the boxes are placed on the floor. Approximately 5 trucks are unloaded at one time.
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Table 4: Average Truck Deliveries to Cologne Assembly, Hall Y.
Date Total 2 3 5 6
Trucks Y-South Y-East Y-North FK Hall
Average 19-30 Oct 98 158.9 87.4 33 6.1 32.4
Data from Wolfgang Sunkel 6. Nov 98
After the material is placed on the floor, the Prifer, or checker, verifies the quantity on the
shipment matches the quantity on the bill of lading. The checker also writes an address and the date on the
box label, which denotes the delivery location.
The material has two possible destinations from the receiving area: direct to the lineside or to the
marketplace. Delivering material direct to the lineside was the primary flow for large material with low
packaging density and/or large, high usage special racks, such as instrument panels, carpets, etc. The
wagons of this type of material were circulated on a fairly regular basis with a delivery cycle time
between 30 to 60 minutes. There was a dedicated driver for this material. Other material that was
delivered directly to the line was material that was running in short supply at the line.
The second delivery option for the material was to the marketplace, which was the method used
for the majority of the material. The marketplace was developed as a temporary holding area for material.
In many cases there was not enough room at the lineside to store all of the material in the plant. The
marketplace served as a temporary buffer for this volume of material. It was located in the vicinity of the
receiving area on the path between the receiving dock and the assembly lines. The assembly line point of
fit determined the aisle for the material in the marketplace. One marketplace aisle was designated for each
of the assembly lines. The material for each of the lines was stored in its specified marketplace. One
forklift driver unloaded the wagons, put the material in the temporary storage location and maintained
control of the marketplace. When the material was needed, this same driver would pull the material out
and put it on a wagon for delivery.
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5.3 Problems with the Current Process
5.3.1 Waste of Waiting
The material receipt process had several different types of waste that were evident. The most
prevalent waste in the current process was waiting. The parts would wait in the trucks outside the plant
for several hours. Next, the parts would wait on the floor of the receiving dock for up to a shift, after
being unloaded from the truck, waiting to be loaded on wagons for delivery. Finally, the parts would wait
still longer, while on the wagons, at the final destination to be unloaded.
One of the primary reasons for the waiting was the lack of information flow between the parts
that were needed at the line and the material drivers. The drivers simply drove the parts that they thought
the line needed or in some cases took whatever trailer they felt like.
Another reason for waiting was the fact that, as the material was stacked in the receiving dock, it
was grouped in an area according to which truck it came in on. The trucks had mixed loads in most cases,
so some of the material on the truck was needed more urgently. The other material simply sat on the dock
until needed or until someone had time to put it away.
An third source of waiting in the current system was due to the manual checks and labeling that
were needed on the invoice from the truck. This manual operation caused an extra step in the unloading
process and the material had to wait while it was checked. The forklift driver that unloaded the truck had
to put the box down for verification, which led to unloading the whole truck as quickly as possible and
then leaving the material in an area until it could be checked. A better way would be to have the
unloading forklift check the invoice and then place the material in a more proper location based on need.
5.3.2 Waste of Production Resources
A second large problem in the system was the waste of production resources that resulted from
the lack of standardized working procedures for the normal material delivery. In most cases trains full of
the same type of material were delivered to the lines at once without mixing the loads. This caused a
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problem at the lineside of where to store the material, since the deliveries were not level with the usage
rates in most cases. Typically this was resolved with a number of unnecessary material moves.
Additionally, the deliveries were typically not based on any type of pull signal from the line. It was a push
system, resulting in higher inventory levels and congestion at the lines that inevitably caused extra work.
Another problem resulting from the lack of standard work within the current system was the lack
of First-In-First-Out, or FIFO, usage of material. The material that came into the receiving dock, in many
cases, may go directly to the line, while older material waited in the marketplace, resulting in a last-in-
first-out usage pattern for the material. Realigning the linefeeding material flow process as described in
Chapter 6 could help this problem significantly. The result of not using FIFO was that material defects
could exist in the older material and would not be easily found.
A third component of the wasted production resources resulted from the distance that the
linefeeders had to travel from the receiving dock to the assembly lines. As stated before, over 50% of the
material was delivered to the south dock. This dock was located about 500 meters from the assembly
lines. There were several other docks that could be used that were less than 100 meters from the assembly
lines. The extra 400 meter material transport is a waste of the production resources.
5.3.3 Waste of Inventory
A third significant waste that emerged from the system was inventory. One of the biggest sources
of this waste was the push system for the material from the suppliers and material handlers. The
perception of what stock was needed, not a pull system, determined what material the material handler
generally delivered to the line. As for the marketplace, whatever was delivered from the suppliers, it was
shoved in the marketplace for later use.
Additionally, the inventory levels were not really controlled. The only material to be worried
about was shortage parts needed for production. The material handlers did not work closely with a
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stockchecker to ensure that material stock levels did not exceed any maximum. The "just-in-case" method
of inventory management was generally followed.
The process was also not very visual in terms of inventory control. The maximum and minimum
material usage levels were not posted. Additionally, the parts were not found in standard locations. The
system was thought to be more "flexible" without these designations by the operators.
5.4 Improvements to the Current System
5.4.1 Improvements to Receiving
The receiving process was not a significant focus area of this research, however there are a few
items that were experimented with during the course of the research. As a result there are only a few
recommendations for improvement to the system that were not implemented during the project.
First, the use of the south dock for over 50% of the material delivery is a significant waste of
manpower to deliver the material to the assembly lines in the eastern part of the plant. Several parts were
identified to move the receiving area from the south to the east dock during the project. The parts
identified were shock absorbers, springs, window glass, roof material, carpets and floor insulation. In
total, this amounted to 5 trucks per day that would be received at the east dock. The movement of these
parts would result in savings of at least one operator for a shift, due to a reduction in transport distance.
An additional result is that the system would be more responsive to the needs of the line since the parts
would be significantly closer. The only negative noted in the system was that there would be an estimated
15% increase in work for the operators at the east receiving dock.
A second area for improvement in the receiving process would be to have the lineside location
printed on the part labels on each box of material. In this manner the forklift drivers could sort the
material as needed at unloading. The forklift driver could scan the barcode on the box to verify the
material contents as well. This would allow the material to flow through the process with fewer "touches"
and less delay. Additionally, the labels could be positioned better on the box. Currently, the label is only
56
found on two sides of the box. By using more stickers as labels, all four sides of the box could be marked
which would help the material handlers.
A third area of improvement would be to divide the material in the dock into regular areas by
destination. For example, there would be an area designated Trim 1 that would contain all of the parts for
that particular line. The forklift driver, upon taking the parts from the truck, could then move the parts to
that particular area of the receiving dock. The material could then be taken on a FIFO basis as needed to
the line or marketplace.
The final suggestion would be to implement timed routes to the assembly line. This concept will
be developed in more detail in Chapter 6. However, the basic concept is that the drivers know the parts
that they need and when they need to deliver them to the line. They could make a regular schedule that
could be assisted by a Heijunka box to help meet the needs of the line that they work with. The operators
were working with a list-based system in December 1998. This system did create a type of pull system,
however the routes were not timed and the delivery process was typically not level with the production
need.
5.4.2 Improvements to the Storage Process - The Marketplace
The primary means to improve the storage process at Cologne investigated during this research
was that of marketplace implementation. A marketplace is a temporary storage area with one specifically
defined storage location for each part. It is used as a holding buffer between the time that the parts are
delivered from the supplier until when the line needs the parts, since in most cases there was not enough
room at the lineside.
5.4.3 Why use a Marketplace?
In theory, the parts in the marketplace exhibit the waste of waiting. Material movements into the
marketplaces are non-value added. The most efficient method would be to have the supplier deliver
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directly to the point of fit at the line, eliminating the need for the marketplace. The marketplace detracts
from quality since parts are allowed to sit, and quality problems may be hidden within them.
However, in certain cases, the marketplace is helpful to buffer the variation in both the customer
(assembly line) demand and the variation in delivery from the supplier. Typically, buffers are not
associated with lean manufacturing, however, even Toyota Georgetown had marketplaces for parts. At
Toyota, parts found in the marketplace were long leadtime parts from Japan or other far away suppliers.
An additional reason for a marketplace is that the shipping cost may be too great to justify the additional
cost of shipping small lots.
Based on its study of TPS, the FPS group recommended installing marketplaces with tightly
controlled inventory levels for the minimum and maximum value of the stock. Marketplaces are a
necessity when trying to covert a typical mass production plant over to lean production. The marketplace
is a buffer that helps organize, sort, and sift parts. Without the marketplace in a brownfield site,
conversion would not be possible because you first need to organize the parts before you can reduce the
inventory level. The purpose of the marketplace is to provide a "corralled" area to confine and organize
the parts. Then the inventory level of the parts can be systematically reduced.
5.4.4 Two Types of Marketplaces - Call versus Card
There are two types of marketplaces resulting from two distinct part types used by FPS, Call and
Card parts. Call parts are parts that require a forklift or some other assist to move from shipping to the
point of fit. Card parts are parts that fit in boxes and that can be delivered by hand. These two types of
parts require different marketplace systems.
Call parts typically come in large boxes or special racks, such as the FLC that was shown in
Figure 2. FPS designates that no more than 20% of the parts should be call parts. The reason for this is
that call parts require specialized equipment in a number of ways. First, typically special racks or boxes
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must be designed for the large parts. Next, expensive forklifts must be purchased requiring many wasted
moves to deliver the parts to the line.
However the largest problem with the call parts is that a large investment is required in the
infrastructure of a call system. The call system is typically a button that would be pushed by the operator
at the line notifying the forklift driver that a part is needed. The forklift driver would then drive to the line
and deliver the part. During research for this project, several call systems were seen. In Ford's Cleveland
Engine Plant, the $500 million call system was removed because it was too inflexible when parts moved
positions on the line (they currently use a call system based on a radio call). At Ford's Saarlouis assembly
plant, almost all the parts were call parts, and the drivers frantically raced around the plant to meet the
calls. However, the infrastructure installed at Saarlouis worked well. Toyota Georgetown also had a few
call parts with a similar infrastructure to that of Saarlouis. In summary, for a call part system to work
well, the ratio of call parts to card parts in the total system should be low. An example of a well-structured
call system is shown in Figure 10, a simplified diagram of Toyota's Georgetown plant. In the Figure, the
dashed lines indicate the information flow and the solid lines the material flow within the plant.
Figure 10: Material Flow for Call Parts at Toyota Georgetown
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Call parts require special marketplaces that work best with floor type storage, where boxes or
racks can be slid by the forklifts pushing them from the back to the front of the lines as shown in Figure
11. Each line can be accessed from either end with defined in and out routes, thereby ensuring FIFO
material flow. In this type of marketplace, boxes are typically stacked vertically to reduce the area
required for storage. Additionally, at Georgetown and Cleveland, the boxes were color coded for better
visual management.
Figure 11: First In First Out Material Flow in the Call Marketplace Lines
In
Push to Front
Out
Theoretical Diagram Actual Marketplace
Card parts are the second part type identified by FPS. They are parts that typically come in small
KLT boxes that were shown in Figure 2. The card delivery process is normally by hand as an operator
drives around the plant on a regular route, similar to the old-fashioned milkman as shown in Figure 12.
Along the route, kanban cards are collected which "pull" the material for the next delivery route. In the
Figure, the information flow and actual path of the card, is indicated by the dashed arrow. The part
delivery and actual kanban route is indicated by the solid arrows. An advantage of the card routes is that
they allow flexibility to be built into the system, by involving employees in the process. Additionally,
they are easier to control the inventory level. Cleveland engine estimated that the new card-based
replenishment system that cost $50,000 to implement has saved $500,000.
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Figure 12: Material Flow for Card Parts in Ford's Cleveland Engine Plant
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One significant problem with card parts is that the shipping density of the parts is reduced.
Therefore, the shipping costs may increase. Additionally, most packaging currently comes in large boxes,
that must be changed to adapt to the card system. One problem with the conversions, according to the
Ford European Packaging Group, is that suppliers normally want to renegotiate the piece price when
changing packaging. Additionally, it takes time to convert to the small packaging.
The card part marketplace typically contains a large number of roll-through racks where boxes
are pulled from the front of the rack and replenished from the rear as shown in Figure 13. Each rack holds
a various number of parts, however each part location is clearly identified and the minimum and
maximum number of boxes allowed is clearly visible. The best practice is typically to have the empty
boxes return down a lower track so that the boxes will be located at an optimal ergonomic level for the
line operator. Additionally, a slide was seen on the racks at Georgetown that allowed the kanban card to
slide from the assembly line's side of the rack by the line to the aisle by gravity, thus eliminating the need
to hand the card over to the material handler in the aisle.
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Figure 13: Roll Through Rack for Card Marketplace
Theoretical Diagram Actual Rack in Cologne Assembly
For both call and card parts, kanban cards are used to determine the total number of boxes, and
therefore inventory, in the system at any time. Additionally, discipline is necessary for both types of
marketplaces to function properly. Throughout the marketplace, part labels for each part, as shown in
Figure 14, must be maintained. Also, parts cannot have mixed locations and inventory levels must be
respected and monitored. Problems must be quickly identified, their root cause determined and a solution
implemented to keep the process working smoothly. Additionally, a key component of a successful
marketplace strategy is that the inventory level is continually reduced to push the system to lower the
level.
Figure 14: Marketplace Part Location Signs With Inventory Level
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5.4.5 Marketplace Development and Implementation
The predominant storage area that was being implemented during this research at Cologne was
the call marketplace. The primary reason for this was that the packaging at the Cologne plant was
typically very large. Additionally, there were extra no drivers available to implement a card based route
during the majority of the course of this research.
The marketplace implementation process began in June 1998, when several marketplaces were
established within a vacant section of the plant. Their purpose was to act as temporary storage sites for the
material until the line needed it. In fact, several empty production lines were used to store material. The
idea was that material would be stored in a regular, defined location with visual indicators of the
minimum and maximum inventory level.
In the beginning, the marketplace was developed to mirror the assembly line. Each aisle in the
marketplace was matched to an aisle in the assembly lines. The first try at implementing a marketplace
left a great deal to be desired. Ideally, the parts would have only been found in one location within the
marketplace that was designated by a sign. In reality, the parts were stored in the lines somewhat
haphazardly. Typically, all of the parts with the same basic part number were grouped together. For
example, all door locks were stored together, however the particular types of door locks (i.e. electric,
manual) were mixed. It was expected that the operators would pull material from the front of the lines in a
FIFO manner and replenishment would be made in the rear as shown in Figure 11. Unfortunately, in the
beginning, FIFO was not regularly used because the storage lines only had access from one side, so older
parts may remain in the back while newer parts are pulled from the front.
An improvement to the first marketplace design was made with some success. The parts that were
stored in lines with access from each end. The boxes could be pushed in from the back and pulled out
from the front. Additionally, signs similar to that shown in Figure 14 were clearly hung above each part
with the part number and minimum and maximum inventory level. The min and max allowed everyone to
easily verify the appropriate inventory level at any time. The min and max were calculated based on the
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methodology presented in Chapter 4. Additionally, the signs helped to organize the material location for
the operators. When a delivery was necessary to the line, it was easy to identify where the material was
stored. The operators commented on several occasions about the advantage of the more visual process.
One problem found within the new marketplace concept was that there must be enough storage
locations for each part. In practice, that was very difficult because the excess parts that the plant had on
any given day would vary. The result was that on some days parts would overflow the maximum allotted
space into other areas. The solution for this should be disciplined application of the "5 Whys" (Womack
et al., 1991, p. 152) process of root cause identification and effectively implementing a solution to reduce
the variation found in the inventory level.
An additional problem resulted from the introduction of a new part number or a part number
change. Typically the new parts were delivered early to the plant where they became mixed in with the
normal production parts. There was not a standard procedure that was always followed for this situation,
so the result was a mixture and sometimes the cars had to be reworked off the line.
5.5 Summary
The material receipt and storage process was haphazard at the beginning of this research at
Cologne. There were many sources of waste and inefficiencies in the process. This research has only
touched on a few of the areas in the material receipt and storage process that could be improved through
more attention to detail and focussing on implementing standard processes.
The advantages that the operators gained by using the marketplace concepts were noted on
several occasions. Operators commented positively about how the organization of the parts helped them
find parts easier.
Implementation of these new ideas within the receiving area was not so successful. This was
mainly due to the fact that no one was willing to take a risk on such a mission critical area of the plant
64
with a new system. Additionally, manpower problems caused many of the new initiatives to be taken
slowly. For example, it was difficult to move some parts to another dock due to manpower concerns.
In summary, this research has generated some alternatives that the plant could use to identify and
eradicate sources of waste in the receiving and storage areas. Hopefully, in the future, the plant will
capitalize on more of these opportunities. Based upon a visit in April 1999, the plant has already begun to
do so by implementing new call marketplaces closer to the line for some parts. Additionally, the receiving
area is now tightly controlling time windows for supplier deliveries for some suppliers. Progress is
definitely going in the right direction.
5.5.1 Key Summary Points
e Approximately 80% of the packaging required large material handling devices for movement at
Cologne as opposed to the FPS target of only 20% of part numbers with large packaging that
requires forklifts.
* Waiting is the primary source of waste within the material receipt system as parts wait to be
delivered.
" Changing part numbers, such as with an engineering change, is difficult to accomplish in the
current system and old parts are mixed with new parts.
* Long delivery paths to the point of fit could be shortened through the use of additional receiving
docks, such as the one available by Rhein River side of the plant.
* Call parts are large parts or boxes delivered with a forklift. They typically require significant
investments in infrastructure for the material handler notification, or "call", however they used
inexpensive floor space.
* Card parts are smaller boxes that can be delivered by hand. They require some investment in roll
through racks for the marketplace. Additionally, the most value is obtained by using these parts
in conjunction with a card-based pull replenishment system.
* A marketplace is useful to organize the material, ensure material use in a FIFO manner and aid
in the control the level of inventory.
* Marketplaces can cause problems when variation causes deliveries into or production pull from
them to exceed the maximum stock levels by large amounts. To alleviate this problem, root
cause problem solving must be effectively implemented. Additionally, a quarantine area should
be developed for overstocked parts.
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Chapter 6: Improvements in the Linefeeding Process
6.1 Introduction
The linefeeding process is closely related to the material receipt process described in Chapter 5.
This discussion will focus on the material delivery to the lineside from either the marketplace or the
receiving area. Additionally, it will cover the removal of the empty containers from the lines. The chapter
proposes a new method of operator alignment to improve the delivery process for the customer.
6.2 Current Linefeeding Methods
The typical method for linefeeding in the Cologne plant was to use a tow motor that could pull 3
wagons behind it loaded with material. A forklift driver, either in the marketplace or in the receiving area,
loaded the wagon train before the delivery. On the other end, at the lineside, a dedicated forklift driver for
the particular assembly line unloaded the train after the driver left it. Another set of drivers pulled the
trainloads of empty boxes and trash away. The system had dedicated drivers that worked only on specific
routes. The specific routes are shown in Figure 15. The duties of the drivers were separated according to
the specific area in which they worked - receiving, recycled containers, trash or marketplace.
Figure 15: Current Cologne Trim Linefeeding Driver Alignment
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The drivers typically took the parts to the line that were available or that were specifically
needed. There was an improvement to this system that was sometimes used by the marketplace drivers.
The improvement was to use a list at the beginning of the shift to document all the parts that were needed.
The driver would then bring those parts on the list as necessary during the shift. The one drawback to this
system was that the drivers typically took full trainloads of the same part. The typical result was that a full
shift of parts was taken to the line on each trip. However, the supervisors were aware of the possibilities
of leveling this system and it was a step in the right direction.
6.3 Problems with the Current System
There were several problems that resulted from the current system. First, the fact that the drivers
were dedicated to a specific function was a tremendous influence in their work methods. All of the
incentive was related to what they were judged on - their own work area's performance. The receiving
area workers tried to clear the receiving area as fast as possible by pushing the material into the assembly
lines or marketplaces, resulting in wagon loads of material sitting in the aisles.
Another problem with the alignment of the drivers was that there was a lack of ownership by the
drivers of each line. When a problem arose, in many cases the drivers would not take ownership for it.
Not because they didn't want to, but because they were not around to hear about the problem. This was
particularly true for the drivers from the receiving dock. The drivers from the marketplace were a bit more
responsive because they worked within the same group as the forklift drivers at the lineside. The primary
reason for this was a lack of communication between the forklift and tow motor drivers.
One of the typical problems that arose were excess parts were delivered to the line while critical
parts that were needed were not delivered. Another problem was that wagon loads of material containing
boxes for two different aisles and several trainloads of trash and empty boxes which impeded the flow of
other material to the lines. Normally the wagons were loaded with all of one type of part. For example, 12
FLC boxes of air cleaner boxes would be on one train. This was not level with the demand from the line.
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6.4 Reduction of Variation
Variation was one of the largest influences in the job of the linefeeders. Variation causes the
demand for particular parts to be unpredictable, which resulted in problems bringing the right part in the
right quantity at the right time. Additionally, it caused problems with storing parts in the marketplaces, on
the lineside or in the receiving area.
6.4.1 Line Variation
The largest source of variation in the plant was the fact that the models on the line were not in a
predictable mix. Only minimal leveling of the models occurs due to the capacity constraints of the lines.
Colors and option packages were not typically leveled and the result was that the linefeeders were not
able to predict what parts they should bring next. In a lean environment, the operators would not need to
predict what to bring, but would replace what was pulled. At the moment, this communication channel
did not exist, so the workers relied solely on their intuition for prediction.
There were many reasons for the variation in the models going down the line. One of the primary
reasons was "batch painting". This was the term used for painting all of the cars in regular batches to
minimize changeover time between models. The result was that cars of the same color would travel down
the line at the same time. The site also had an Automatic Sequencing and Retrieval System, ASRS, that
would attempt to match the sequence of cars coming out of paint with the predicted sequence for
assembly.
6.4.2 Packaging
The packaging also led to the variation in the demands on the drivers. As stated before, the
packaging was not standardized around a certain amount of time per box. The result was that the driver
did not know when the box needed to be replaced. In Toyota's factory, the material handler has a route of
a specified time. The boxes were sized based on the length of the route. The result was less waste within
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the system. In the Cologne plant, the size of the box was based on the standard size that would fit in the
truck for minimum shipping cost or based on the size of the part's previous cardboard packaging.
The packaging also caused the additional problem that it required many forklifts to move the
material. This resulted in reduced flexibility with the handling of the boxes. In contrast, Toyota has
changed most of its parts over to small boxes that can be delivered by hand. This changeover results in
increased amounts of flexibility to meet the changing needs of the line with the material flow and lineside
space required.
6.4.3 Storage Problems
One of the most visible problems caused by variation was the fact that material would build up in
the lines, marketplaces or receiving area. The predictions that the drivers made about material usage by
the line resulted in wasted material. Normally this excess material would back up in the aisles on trailers
waiting to be unloaded. The forklift drivers would have to waste moves to get around this extra material
to find the parts that were actually needed. The lack of standardized storage locations was one cause of
the excess material problems, however the other cause was the variation of the line.
6.5 Improvements to the Current System
The management of the current system was a complex web of people and work groups. A simple
improvement to the current system was proposed by one of the material handling supervisors. The
solution involved simply realigning the wagon train drivers to a particular line and eliminating the
functional division of labor.
The way the new system worked is displayed in Figure 16. Each driver was reassigned to one
particular aisle to serve in the assembly line. The driver was responsible for driving the wagons of
material from the marketplace or receiving area to the lineside, removing the trash wagons and returning
the recyclable containers to the receiving area. The reorganization process freed one operator to focus on
new work methods for small part delivery using kanban cards.
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Figure 16: Realignment of Linefeedng Drivers for the Cologne Trim Lines
Recovngtre HOD/TOD Total 7 Drivers
OE
I Critical OF/OG
Part Driver
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Benefits from this system were very obvious during the functional test performed on one
assembly line. Teamwork between the driver and forklift operator for each assembly line was enhanced.
This eliminated a large portion of the expediting work for the critical part driver and allowed them to
focus on other improvement opportunities. Additionally, the assembly line was better served because they
knew who was responsible for the material that they needed. The aisles were also kept clear of the excess
wagon trains that had collected previously.
Based upon a visit to the Cologne plant in April 1999, the new process is currently in place and
working well. The aisles were clear from trailers and the critical part expeditor's work is less. In addition,
the material drivers are all currently under the linefeeding supervisor for the trim lines. This helped to
realign the drivers' interests to serving the line rather than simply keeping their own area running
smoothly.
6.6 Summary
At the beginning of the project, the material linefeeding process at Cologne did not exemplify any
of the traits of lean manufacturing. There was no standardized work in the processes, waiting throughout
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the system, excessive transport and wasted motion. In the end, a process was developed that would level
the load on the drivers and provide better service to the assembly line. The process reorganized the work
of the linefeeding driver around serving one assembly line rather than a functional organization. In the
end a test route was developed and successfully implemented, and continues to run as of April 1999.
6.6.1 Key Summary Points
" The linefeeding system, arranged by job function, caused problems with waste of waiting,
overproduction, and production resources.
* Within the current arrangement, expediters are required to ensure that the customer gets what is
needed.
* Alignment of the drivers by aisle will make them more responsive to customer demand and
eliminate large amounts of waste, while at the same time keeping the plant more organized and
clean.
e Variation is a cause of large problems within the linefeeding process at the moment resulting
from many sources.
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Chapter 7: Organizational Culture and Change
7.1 Introduction
As previously stated, the Cologne site began production under Henry Ford in the 1930s. Mass
production methods have become very deeply engrained in the plant and new methods are not accepted
easily. Improvements were accomplished by encouraging the workers to try new ideas and to work
independently to implement new methods. However, some other issues, such as work culture and lack of
communication, stood in the way of some of the implementation. This chapter also presents a few
learning points that I gained from performing this research.
7.2 The Culture of the Work Environment
The many years of traditional mass production at Cologne have made new methods hard to
accept. In many cases, inventory in the plant is viewed as part of doing business. The extra box of
inventory was "just in case" they ran out, and was not viewed as waste. In fact, workers preferred to have
inventory on hand, that way the management did not yell at them for being the source of a line stoppage.
This outlook was very difficult to overcome when implementing new systems.
7.2.1 Management Style
The management style in the plant remains very traditional and hierarchical. There was a
tremendous rift between workers and management driven primarily by the union. The workers were not
typically involved in daily decisions, but simply told what to do and how to do it in many cases. The
management style results in a traditional "pass the buck" mentality since in many cases workers were not
trusted to make decisions and typically were not rewarded for taking initiative.
Additionally, the involvement of workers in the process was made worse as a result of racial
tensions within the plant. In many cases, the plant workers were not German. Typically, workers were
immigrants from Italy or Turkey that have come to Germany in search of high wage jobs. In some cases
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that I saw, the workers could not even speak German. This makes worker involvement extremely
difficult.
7.2.2 Culture of the German Workforce
The German workforce has many strengths, two of which are is its creativity and high technical
skill. This combination leads to very unique problem solutions. The new ideas created working together
with the people during this research added significant value to the firm. However, in several situations a
significant emphasis was placed on implementing an overly technical solution to the problem. Care must
be taken to keep the solutions simple and "right sized" for the process. Additionally, the creative nature
and the historical "craft" nature of the German production works against standardized work. There was an
emphasis on each group doing it their own way rather than standardizing on the one method and then
improving upon that. Implementing new methods was difficult because they would typically be
customized.
Additionally, there are several cultural factors within the German working environment that
makes it more difficult to apply new ideas in practice. One particular challenge is communication.
German industry is very hierarchical. Working groups are typically very narrowly focused and decisions
tend to go up the ladder and then back down through the chain of command. This is not very conducive to
group decision making. The problem is compounded by the vastness of the assembly operations.
Proposed changes may affect many different groups and all must approve the changes. Womack suggests
restructuring the teams of the typical German company to "be focussed horizontally on a linked set of
activities along the value stream and perform many of the indirect tasks associated with managing their
work, including quality assurance, machine maintenance, tool changes, development of standard work
and continuous improvement." (Womack et al., 1996, p. 215)
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7.2.3 Other Issues
One of the biggest problems encountered was the high absenteeism within the workforce.
Approximately 20% of the workers were out on average. In several cases that I noted, over a 3 year time
period several workers were absent in each of those years more than 60 days per year on medical release.
This absence was in addition to the standard 12 weeks of vacation for each line worker. The impact to
productivity is enormous. The supervisors are constantly shifting workers around to meet the daily
schedule. On the job training in a new role is a daily occurrence. Finally, continuous improvement is
almost impossible; the workers are just trying to survive the day and get the job done.
7.3 Gaining Acceptance for New Ideas
In spite of these issues stated above, many aspects of the project were implemented, at least in
part, in the plant. The reason for the success was the investment in time during the first few months to
build trust with the workforce. A large amount of time was spent getting integrated into the workforce.
The majority of the work took place with the material handling supervisors and workers group. The
process of becoming integrated and building trust within the group was essential for the success of the
project.
Many reasons stood in the way of integration of the author into the group of material handling
workers at Cologne - national culture and language, company culture, educational background, etc. Ed
Schein (1992, pp. 70-93), considered one of the founders of the field of organizational psychology, has
developed six basic processes typically necessary for managing the integration of groups that can be used
as a framework for the integration process of the author. The following are the processes and short
descriptions of their relationship to the integration process:
1. Creating a common language and conceptual categories
" The author definitely didn't share the same verbal or nonverbal language, in that he didn't
fully understand the German culture.
" The production team did not share a knowledge base in lean manufacturing. This led to
training and lengthy explanations about the process to the workers, who were skeptical since
it was far outside of their normal mode of operations.
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* The culture of the plant and the methods of getting things done was not obvious in the
beginning of the research. The more people that were asked about a certain initiative, the
more often you were told no.
2. Defining group boundaries and criteria for inclusion and exclusion
* It seemed that the team hoped that the research project would pass without them having to
change many of their processes and therefore did not at first want to help with the project.
3. Distributing power and status
e The external power structure between the company supervisor, the plant FPS team, and other
constituents such as the plant layout group seemed to play an important role in the politics of
the situation.
* The group had an informal power structure. There were several factors within it. First, ethnic
background was one source of power. Additionally, seniority in the plant and job was another.
* The receiving area supervisor was in a position of power to help promote the project since he
knew the right people and had a great deal of experience. However, it seemed that others were
not always so eager to work together.
* The author had the label of Praktikant, or intern, from a German university. The title seemed
to not have a very high status within the organization. This label was not exactly equivalent to
the experience brought to the table by the LFM author given the 4 years of work experience
and MIT training.
4. Developing norms of intimacy and friendship
* Working together with the workers on the floor over several Saturdays to implement the
marketplace developed a sense of trust and shared concern that helped out throughout the
project.
* Additionally, really listening to the ideas of the supervisors and the workers, a sense of trust
and a good working relationship with the material handling supervisors was developed.
5. Defining and allocating rewards and punishments
e During the research, the only rewards that the author could provide were friendly greetings or
thank yous, however those did build credibility and trust.
6. Explaining the unexplainable - ideology and religion
* The culture of the Cologne plant was a sort of ideology of "you scratch my back, I'll scratch
yours." Continually, people tended to do favors for one another because of a good old boy
network and not necessarily because of a business need.
" Additionally, the FPS team at the plant thought that they had a brand new ideology (that of
lean manufacturing) that they were implementing. The FPS team shunned any involvement
from external resources.
* The material handling group had an ideology of not letting the line stop. They should always
have the parts just in case. That was the guiding principal for many years, so changing
principals was difficult.
In the end, through persistence and using the trust that was formed, several improvements were
implemented. The strategy used to implement the new techniques was to start in a small area of the plant
and then expand from there once the concept was proved. An area of the trim lines was isolated and used
as a test bed for implementing the marketplace. Based upon the April 1999 visit, the ideas and initiatives
started during 1998 continue to function and have expanded. The supervisors have taken the ideas upon
themselves to push forward.
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7.4 Learning by Doing During This Research
There were many things that I learned throughout the process of this research. First, relationships
are critical to getting things done. Next, implementing change is best accomplished in a small test area.
Finally, the importance of maintaining focus within the research.
The successes that this project was able to achieve were primarily due to help that I received from
all of the workers in the material handling group. They were the ones that had to change the procedures
and work methods. Without their trust, nothing would have changed. I spent several months building
relationships and earning the trust of the supervisors and workers on the shop floor. This time was
invaluable since the result was that together we achieved results on the project.
Second, it is very important to limit the implementation of a new concept to a small test area so
that you can evaluate the effects on the full system. This is particularly true in a plant with the size of
Cologne. We initially implemented marketplaces for approximately one third of the material used by the
plant over a two-week period. It worked, but only because there was a forklift driver that worked in the
area that was twice as fast as the typical man. There were several problems associated with this initial
implementation. Following the implementation of this original marketplace, the team implemented a
second marketplace on a smaller scale using some best practices seen at other Ford sites and at Toyota.
This marketplace was sized for parts from only one aisle of the plant and proved a more effective size on
which to test the marketplace concepts. In the end, a marketplace concept that was functional and scalable
was developed.
Finally, throughout the project it I found that it was important to stay focused on the goals. In
many cases, this research was interrupted by some "firefighting" of daily problems or diversions into
other mini-projects that arose. In each of these situations, while they did help to learn more about the
system, the objectives of the project may have slipped as a result. As a corrective action, it is necessary to
develop a timeline with key milestones and measure the progress of the project against that on a regular
basis.
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In summary, there were several key lessons that I am taking from the work presented here as I go
forward. I will continue to work to develop trust and relationships within the area where I am trying to
accomplish a task. Additionally, I will focus on small chunks of a project that can be scaled. Finally,
maintaining a schedule with key objectives is critical to ensuring the timely success of a project.
7.5 Summary
Overall, the process implementing the new ideas was a bit frustrating. Building the trust was a
difficult, but necessary step in the process. Cultural issues arose along several dimensions - traditional
hierarchical management behavior, lack of communication among groups and my standing as an outsider.
Learning the language and the culture was critical to adjusting to this environment. In the end the
credibility of the ideas was also necessary along with a thick skin to take no for an answer. In the end,
persistence was the primary reason any of the new ideas were implemented.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
8.1 Results Achieved and Conclusions
The Cologne assembly plant desired to improve the material handling processes by using lean
manufacturing methods. Through the course of this research several different areas of the Cologne
operations have been positively affected.
First, by proposing simple inventory controls using the Base Stock Model, a one time savings in
working capital of $1,000,000 could be achieved plus an annual savings of $200,000 annually based on a
16% cost of capital. The system had inventory in the wrong place at the wrong time and the customer
service level was low. By implementing the proposed methods, the assembly line should be able to have
the required part 99% of the time. Additionally, as a side result, by lowering the level of inventory in the
system, it should improve the focus on quality within the plant.
Second, the material receipt and storage processes were redesigned in some areas to improve the
visibility of the process. Signs were used to organize parts into a specified place and the optimal inventory
labels were specified. First in, first out material flow methods were implemented to improve the visibility
of quality problems within incoming material. Finally, new receiving areas were proposed for closer
receiving to the point of use. The result was a more visible process with smaller amounts of waste.
Linefeeding was the final area of focus. The system was redesigned from having drivers
responsible for a function, such as recyclable container removal, into one where the drivers were
responsible for all tasks related to a specific line of the plant. The new method was implemented in a test
line in the plant with success. The drivers were more responsive to the needs of the assembly line. The
number of parts that were expedited was reduced. Excessive inventory in the lines was reduced since the
drivers were more aware of the requirements. Finally, the lines were clear from extra wagons that were
left in the area by drivers that did not have a direct interest in the operation of the line.
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In summary, the operations of material handling at the Cologne plant were significantly enhanced
through the results of this work. However, the biggest achievement of the project was the fact that the
material handling and assembly operations were exposed to the elements of lean manufacturing. Since
leaving the plant, the foundation that was started through this project is beginning to expand. One aspect
of improvement, since December 1998, is that more marketplaces were established as of April 1999.
Additionally, the stockcheckers are becoming more accountable for the material stock levels and the
drivers are helping to improve the service level of the line. Overall, even if the results of this research are
carried no further, at least the plant has had the exposure to a new way of thinking about material
handling.
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